When you make sex political, you shouldn't be shocked to be called a #CUNT

( Jane Fonda and Gloria Steinem Call for Government Suppression of Rush Limbaugh’s Radio Broadcasts) This isn’t political. While we disagree with Limbaugh’s politics, what’s at stake is the fallout of a society tolerating toxic, hate-inciting speech. For 20 years, Limbaugh has hidden behind the First Amendment, or else claimed he’s really “doing humor” or “entertainment.” He is indeed constitutionally entitled to his opinions, but he is not constitutionally entitled to the people’s airways.

(Eugene Volokh) Of course it is “political” — they’re urging the government to suppress Limbaugh’s speech based on the ideology that it expresses. And this is precisely what the Supreme Court has rightly said is impermissible. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978), the Court did uphold restrictions on vulgar words on the radio — a question that’s now being reconsidered by the Court, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. — but in the process the plurality said:

[I]f it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.

Justice Brennan’s dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, would have been even more speech-protective; and none of the other concurring or dissenting justices cast any doubt on the plurality’s judgment, which indeed represents a basic First Amendment principle — the government may not suppress speech based on its viewpoint, even if the speech is seen as using “government resource[s]” (see, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector (1995)). That is something that applies to all viewpoints, whether feminist or sexist, pro-American or anti-American, or whatever else.
Likewise, FCC v. League of Women Voters (1984) held that even broadcast regulation must be closely scrutinized to prevent, at least, viewpoint discrimination and often even viewpoint-neutral content discrimination:

Since, as we [have] observed …, “[t]he First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic,” we must be particularly wary in assessing § 399 to determine whether it reflects an impermissible attempt “to allow a government [to] control … the search for political truth.”

And that’s exactly the control that Fonda, Steinem, and Morgan want the government to exercise.

Denied