Jamaican Cleric Uses Web To Spread Jihad Message

Faisal Shahzad, the Pakistani-American who is accused of trying to detonate a car bomb in Times Square earlier this month, says he was radicalized by the Internet. Intelligence officials tell NPR that one of his inspirations is Sheik Abdullah Faisal, who recently set up shop in the Caribbean.
Radicalizing young men like Shahzad used to be a process that took months and generally required one-on-one recruiting, officials say. Now the radicalization process appears to happen at breakneck speed, just with the click of a mouse.
Linked To Plots Around The World
Faisal is one of the best known radical clerics on the Internet today. NPR set up an interview with Abdullah Faisal weeks ago. But when he arrived to speak to us in Montego Bay last week, he demanded money for the interview. NPR refused. So he declined to speak on tape.

read the rest via europenews.dk

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South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program

Some folks on Seesmic Video asked for a background on this.  This was shared with me by Charles W. Schowalter and is an overview from MIT

South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program

David Albright, President
Institute for Science and International Security March 14, 2001

South Africa is the only country to voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons. Many other states, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil, abandoned their nuclear programs before they developed a weapon capability. However, South Africa's abandonment of its twenty- to thirty-year-old nuclear weapons program remains unique.
South Africa's first device was completed in 1979. A decade of weapons development followed, leading to plans to mate nuclear warheads with ballistic missiles. In 1990, President F. W. de Klerk terminated the program and in 1991 South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA then conducted an unprecedented verification of nuclear rollback. Although the IAEA was traditionally concerned only with the accuracy of a nation's declaration, after the agency's failure to detect Iraq's nuclear program the IAEA shifted its focus also to verifying the completeness of a nation's declaration of nuclear activities and facilities.
The official history of South Africa's nuclear weapons program as stated by South African government officials sidesteps some issues and is misleading on others. ISIS has interviewed South African nuclear scientists and government officials and collected material from South Africa and the IAEA to develop a more complete history of this program. The case of South Africa provides the only example of verification of nuclear rollback and highlights the extreme difficulty of verifying nuclear disarmament.
South Africa's nuclear program began during World War II with the discovery of major uranium deposits in the country. South Africa's first large-scale nuclear research and development project was initiated in 1959 under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Board (AEB). Although members of the former apartheid government claim that this project was not weapons-related, the African National Congress (ANC) believes that the ultimate goal of this early project was a nuclear weapon. The heart of the program was an indigenous nuclear power reactor fueled with natural uranium. Research on uranium enrichment was also commenced. A nuclear research center, including a US-provided research reactor, was established at Pelindaba. In 1967, South Africa abandoned the indigenous power reactor program while moving uranium enrichment to the pilot plant stage.
In 1967, South Africa combined its experience gained with the power reactor and uranium enrichment programs to launch a program to build peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs). In 1970, South Africa announced the construction of a uranium enrichment plant, called the Y-Plant, at Valindaba, next to Pelindaba. Realizing that the large facility could not be hidden from outsiders, South Africa publicly announced the existence of the plant but kept secret the uranium enrichment technology and its plans to produce weapons-grade uranium. South Africa had tremendous problems getting the plant to work properly and the net effect was that output was only half as much as expected. Despite these problems, by the end of the 1980s, the plant had produced roughly 500 kilograms of uranium enriched to at least 80%.
In 1970, a committee within the AEB recommended that the government develop several types of PNEs including those based on gun-type and implosion-type designs (Type A) as well as boosted fission (Type A*) and thermonuclear designs (Type B). In 1971, the Minister of Mines approved development of the Type A devices. In 1973, theoretical work on Type B devices was approved and two years later approval was granted for the construction of facilities to produce the material needed for thermonuclear devices.
The AEB scientists chose to focus on the gun-type design and had completed theoretical work on such a design by 1973. In 1976, the first full scale test of the device, using natural uranium instead of enriched uranium, was conducted successfully. The next year, South Africa completed its first full-scale device (minus the highly enriched uranium). The huge device, 4.5 meters long and 3400 kilograms in weight, was suitable only for a static test. South Africa began its search for a test site in 1973 and by 1977 had completed two shafts in the Kalahari Desert. Preparations for a cold test were detected in August 1977 by the United States and Soviet Union forcing South Africa to halt its test preparation activities. Following this episode, AEB scientists miniaturized the design of the device so that it was only 2 meters long, weighed 750 kilograms and would be ready for testing at short notice.
By 1977, AEB also established nuclear weapon research and development and production facilities at Pelindaba. Around this time, South Africa's security environment had deteriorated with the introduction of Cuban forces into Angola and the imposition of a military embargo by the United Nations. In 1978, P.W. Botha became prime minister of South Africa and a nuclear strategy was developed. While the AEB felt that an underground test would be a sufficient deterrent, the military believed that a fully weaponized nuclear capability was needed to provide a credible deterrent. As a result, responsibility for the weaponization program was transferred to Armscor, South Africa's primary weapon development agency. By 1982, Armscor had built its first device, a relatively simple bomb. Subsequently it made extensive modifications to the AEB weapon design to meet the military's requirements for safety, security and reliability.
In 1985, the government capped the weapons program at seven gun-type devices and limited HEU production at the Y-Plant to that needed to meet this goal. Research on implosion, boosted fission and thermonuclear designs continued but work on plutonium-based weapons was halted. In addition, development of a ballistic missile to replace the aging Buccaneer bombers as a nuclear delivery system was continued. Armscor also received additional funds to build a new weapon production facility called Advena Central Laboratory.
South Africa's nuclear strategy, originally developed in the late 1970s, had three phases. Phase one consisted of perpetuating strategic uncertainty regarding South Africa's nuclear capabilities. If South Africa faced an overwhelming conventional military threat and the West was unwilling to intervene on its behalf, South Africa would implement phase two of the strategy. Under this phase, South Africa would covertly acknowledge the existence of its nuclear weapons to key Western powers in the hope of inducing their intervention. If this approach did not succeed, South Africa would move to phase three, the adoption of an overt deterrent posture, which included several options. South Africa would publicly acknowledge the existence of its nuclear stockpile, conduct an underground nuclear test, or detonate a nuclear explosion on the surface. South Africa calculated that the West's determination to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons would force them to place South Africa under their nuclear umbrella in the event of a crisis. The implementation of South Africa's nuclear strategy never progressed beyond phase one.
By 1989, South Africa had six devices in its arsenal, each containing 55 kilograms of HEU, and enough HEU for a seventh device. South Africa took several precautions to safeguard its weapon stockpile. All the devices were stored unassembled with the front and rear portions of the weapons stored in separate vaults. Four codes, including one held by the president, were required to assemble the two parts into a weapon. In addition, to prevent premature detonation of a device, the weapons would only arm once they reached a certain altitude on board their delivery aircraft. Armscor based its safeguards largely on American practices.
By late 1989, the departure of Cuban forces from Angola, the decline of the Soviet Union and the independence of Namibia, had significantly improved South Africa's security situation. President F.W. de Klerk, elected in September 1989, sought an end to the apartheid regime and South Africa's acceptance back into the international community. The nuclear weapons program was viewed an obstacle to these goals and orders were issued for the termination of the program. By the time South Africa joined the NPT in the summer of 1991 and IAEA inspections began later that year the program had been dismantled and its nuclear weapon manufacturing facilities had been decontaminated. Largely because of domestic and international pressure, de Klerk announced the existence of the former weapons program and began cooperating with IAEA efforts to verify the rollback of the program.
With access to South African records, the IAEA recalculated the Y-Plant's production on a day-to-day basis and arrived at a final estimate within about 5-10 kilograms of South Africa's declaration. The IAEA was able to verify the scope and timing of the South African nuclear weapons program and its subsequent dismantlement.
South Africa's success in developing nuclear weapons can be attributed to five elements. First, South Africa mastered the highly enriched uranium production process. Second, the nation had a defense industry which could produce nuclear delivery systems. Third, the program had good scientists and technicians. Fourth, the program had a good foreign procurement network. Fifth, the weapons' design was kept simple and low in cost. The international sanctions placed on South Africa in the 1970s slowed but did not stop its nuclear weapon program. In fact, the imposition of the sanctions in the 1970s may have hardened South Africa's determination to build nuclear weapons.
Rapporteur: Gregory Koblentz

---

back to seminar schedule, spring 2001

via web.mit.edu

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Frog horde is latest Greek plague

An economy on the brink. Horrible pollution. And now a "carpet of frogs" to contend with? Greece sure has it tough these days.
On Wednesday, a horde of frogs caused a two-hour closure on one of Greece's major highways near the city of Thessaloniki. The city's traffic police chief, Giorgos Thanoglou, told the Associated Press that the "millions" of frogs were probably looking for food. Three accidents resulted, as drivers attempted to dodge the hungry hoppers. The AP writes that no human injuries were reported.

AP

via news.yahoo.com

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wait... who is flying the plains?

(Ha'aretz) The Israeli Air Force is holding a joint exercise this week with the Greek Air Force in the skies above the Aegean Sea.

The exercise, named "MINOAS 2010", is supposed to continue through the weekend.

According to Greek media reports, 10 IAF planes are participating in the exercise – five F-15I Rams and five F16I Sufas. These are the newest aircraft in the IAF fleet and are able to carry out long-range attack missions. An IAF refueling tanker is also reported to be taking part in the drill.

via thejidf.org

conflict between Iran and Russia

The international headlines this morning are on the drama of an apparent public row between the Iranian and Russian leaders. 

The fuse was lit in a speech by President Ahmadinejad in Kerman. As usual, he focused on the international rather than the domestic front, but this time he had a surprise:

Today it has become very difficult to explain [Russian President Dmitry] Medvedev’s behaviour to our people. Iranians do not understand whether they (the Russians) are our neighbour and friend standing by our side or are after other things.

But non-Western media really noticed the bangs when Moscow, through Presidential advisors, fought back. Foreign Policy specialist Sergei Prikhodko stated:

Any unpredictability, any political extremism, lack of transparency or inconsistency in taking decisions that affect and concern the entire world community is unacceptable for us. It would be good if those who are now speaking in the name of the wise people of Iran … would remember this.

Russia has been playing a balancing game between Tehran and “Western” powers for months. Medvedev was one of the rare leaders who dared to appear in public with Ahmadinejad last summer, and the Russians maintained that projects such as the Bushehr nuclear power plant would be completed.

On the other hand, Medvedev — in contrast to his Foreign Ministry — has publicly signalled since last autumn that further sanctions can be considered if Iran did not shift its position over uranium enrichment. The Russians have delayed shipments and confirmation of contracts over missiles, and Bushehr’s opening date repeatedly slips.
Even last week, the Janus-faced policy of Russia continued. The sharp US response, with the introduction of a sanctions resolution to the UN Security Council, to the Iran-Brazil-Turkey declaration on uranium enrichment came after discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Yet Moscow restated that Bushehr would come on-line in August, and the US press reported that Russian suppliers would continue to send missile components to Tehran.

So what happened for Ahmadinejad to disrupt the balance with his public statement? The obvious speculation is that Russia has refused to peel away from the sanctions move in the UN, but the truth is we don’t know. It’s unlikely that the warning from the Iran President is going to worry Moscow — what cards of pain can Tehran play against the Russians? — so Ahmadinejad’s statement appears as pique, anger, or even miscalculation.
For its part, the US has kept quiet, which seems the wise move. And China, the other “balancing” power in the UN Security Council, has also said nothing.

via enduringamerica.com

no doubt there is a quarrel, but is it good friends having a difference or is the Russian Bear ready to backstab their friend? Let's analyze what Russia loses by losing Iran. a friendly neighbor... obviously, but more so they would lose the energy reserves in the Black Sea that Tehran has in the past been aggressive about. Certainly Russia has it's own energy reserves. Perhaps Russia is feeling the pressure to betray and is weighing it's options. Foreign Minister of Israel felt that Israel's best bet during the Obama era was to cozy up to Moscow. My guess is Iran is having a tantrum.

Posted via web from noahdavidsimon's posterous

 

or perhaps this is what the big feud was about:

Most of the projectiles in the Syrian, Hizballah and Hamas arsenals are propelled by liquid fuel and therefore take 50 minutes to 1 hour to load and loose at assigned targets. During this time gap, they are vulnerable to air attack. As a bridging device, western intelligence sources believe the joint command in Damascus plans to attack Israel with synchronized missile fire from Iran and Syria during the time Israeli warplanes are hammering, say, Hizballah batteries in Lebanon.

The thinking in Tehran and Damascus is that the Israeli Air Force will find it hard to tackle three or four fronts simultaneously.

Tehran and Damascus are therefore building air shields around their missile bases and launching sites, for which purpose Assad asked Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to speed up the delivery of the advanced Russian Pantsir anti-aircraft missiles when the latter visited Damascus on May.

Medvedev promised to accede to this request.

debkafile's military sources recall that the same Russian Pantsir missiles were ineffective in preventing the September 2007 air strike, by which Israel destroyed the North Korean plutonium reactor financed by Tehran at Al-Azur in northern Syria.

via docstalk.blogspot.com